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Introduction 
 
In 2004 the scope of UK’s National Minimum Wage (NMW) was widened to provide a 
wage floor of £3 an hour for 16 and 17 year olds (excluding Modern Apprenticeships 
(MA)) to prevent undue exploitation. The Low Pay Commission (LPC) has made it clear 
that these young workers constitute a distinct segment of the labour market. Although 
future uprating reviews will coincide with those for workers aged 18 and above, there 
should not be any correlation between the way 16 and 17 year olds (young workers) and 
workers aged 18 and above (older workers) are treated.  
 
In 2005 there were 1.58 million 16 and 17 year olds, some 4% of the total working 
population, of which 822,000 were economically active. Nearly three-quarters are in full-
time education (FTE), and 35% of this group is also employed. Although the employment 
rate of some 430,000 young workers not in education has been falling since 1998, youth 
employment is particularly high among this age group (Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), 2003; LPC, 2005). Employment amongst 16 and 17 year olds is highly 
concentrated in low paying industries, and the dominance of the retail and hospitality 
sectors is confirmed by the fact that they employ two-thirds of all young workers. Eighty 
per cent of all full-time students and sales and retail assistants alone account for nearly 
37% of all occupations (LPC, 2006).  
 
Young workers’ low pay is not simply a function of where they work but is related to the 
jobs they do and, given that there will have been limited opportunity to develop skills, the 
personal qualities they bring to the job. Pay may therefore depend on the tasks 
undertaken, the amount of responsibility given and the conditions under which work is 
performed. It may also be related to different levels of ability, skills, knowledge and the 
amount of effort that is made. Finally, wage setting is also rather informal with 
considerable scope for discretion (Lucas and Langlois, 2001; Gilman et al., 2002). The 
recent Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 raise the possibility that employers 
may be subject to pay discrimination claims on grounds of age, but only where employers 
do not base their pay structure on the NMW (www.dti.gov.uk/er/equality/age). If a 
younger worker can successfully claim job and pay parity with an older worker in these 
circumstances, then questions are raised about the efficacy of the way in which the NMW 
treats younger workers [1]. 
 
This paper explores the basis of the LPC’s presumption of the ‘distinctiveness’ of young 
workers in the absence of any systematic and objective basis for determining ‘fair pay’, 
using selected evidence from an examination of the pay and employment practices of 
hospitality businesses in North Wales. The literature review considers theoretical 
justification for lower youth pay and the issues it raises about the nature of training and 
skill, and analyses and evaluates how these factors have informed the LPC’s approach to 
the issue of young workers’ pay. The methodology outlines the nature of the empirical 
study and the interview process, which included the application of a method designed to 
enable managers to ‘evaluate’ job content and employees’ personal attributes in order to 
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provide a clearer explanation of the underlying reasons for the differences between the 
pay of 16-17 year olds (young workers) and workers aged 18 years and above. The results 
are presented and in the discussion we consider how far the presumption of distinctiveness 
can be objectively justified, whether this presumption is reflected in employers’ pay and 
employment policies and whether their practices perpetuate and reinforce inequality and 
discrimination towards young workers. Conclusions are drawn and policy issues 
highlighted. 
 
Labour market theory 
 
Standard labour market models consistently predict that the most vulnerable members of 
the labour force, particularly young people, are those with lower levels of investment, 
skills and productivity (Miles, 2000).The main justification for lower pay for young 
workers is rooted in human capital theory, which implies that businesses set wage 
differentials according to the productivity levels of their workers that are determined by 
the background characteristics of the worker. Young workers’ location at the bottom of an 
upward sloping wage profile by age can be explained by the increase in human capital or 
skills, commensurate with increased experience (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). 
Individuals who possess higher levels of education, training and work experience are seen 
as the most productive and, consequently, receive higher wages (Atkinson et al., 1998). 
Young workers’ lower pay is simply the result of inadequacies in personal skills. For 
many years this was reflected in age-related pay, usually expressed as a percentage of the 
adult rate (LPC, 2001, 2004), the justification being less experience and immature 
judgement (Scott, 1976).  
 
The segmented labour market model argues that low paid jobs cannot arise from 
productivity alone, rather demand and supply side factors ensure the labour market is 
inherently segmented (Rubery, 1992). Human capital theory is criticised for its focus on 
worker attributes and for ignoring other attributes associated with the firm or market with 
respect to low pay, which create a dual labour market (McNabb and Whitfield, 1998). 
High wages, job security, good training investment and benefits are found in primary 
labour markets, whereas low wages, insecure employment and poor opportunities 
characterise secondary labour markets. These socially downgraded low paid jobs are 
generally occupied by disadvantaged people in the labour market such as women, ethnic 
minorities and those with low educational achievement, both young and older workers 
(Sachdev and Wilkinson, 1998). Their low pay is not related to lack of skills; rather their 
skills are not recognised or valued. 
 
Efficiency wage theory posits that perceived differences about a worker’s productivity 
arise from the sorting effects of wages and adverse selection. Where costlessly observable 
characteristics, such as education and prior experience, are the same, employers may offer 
workers the same wage. As there is a cost associated with measuring skills and abilities, 
there is a reluctance to link pay to these unknown attributes (Weiss, 1986). Hence 
employers rely on observable characteristics as the main proxies for determining wages, 
with the effect, as in segmentation theory, that some skills may not be recognised or 
valued. These factors may also explain higher unemployment rates for young people who 
have left education early but increased job opportunities for students. 
 
These theoretical models raise questions about the nature of training and skills that are 
required to do jobs, an issue we turn to next.  
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Training and skill 
 
Placing heavy reliance on training to justify pay differences can be problematic in 
industries that employ large numbers of young workers and generally make little or no 
investment in formal training (Grossberg and Sicilian 1999; Kitching and Blackburn, 
2003; Langlois and Lucas, 2005). Many jobs in the retail and hospitality sectors are low 
skilled and entail minimal or basic training requirements (Royle, 2000; Korczynski, 2002; 
Lucas, 2004). Experienced worker standard (EWS) can be achieved fairly quickly, further 
undermining the rationale or justification for differentiating workers’ pay by age based on 
training, which may have been more sustainable in the past when many young people 
served apprenticeships or were being trained for more ‘technically’ skilled jobs (Scott, 
1976). The dominance of retail and hospitality employment would appear to place a large 
tranche of young workers into the second broad model identified by Neathy et al. (2004) - 
in jobs requiring little or no formal training (generally students) such as sales - rather than 
in employment or a trainee position in services such as vehicle maintenance. There is little 
investment in human capital, jobs may be segmented and the sorting effects of wages and 
adverse selection may be present. 
 
But what does ‘skill’ mean? Skill is an elusive concept that is not only a function of 
factors associated with individuals and their human capital, but is also about how jobs are 
designed and performed (Littler, 1982; Korczynski, 2002; Grugulis and Vincent, 2006). It 
can be difficult to separate the job from the person. The presence of terms such as 
communication, team working, motivation, judgement, initiative and ability to improve 
personal learning in contemporary definitions of skill (Department for Education and 
Employment, 2000) shows how far definitions that incorporate knowledge, technical 
capability and job autonomy have been marginalised (Keep and Mayhew, 1999). Tangible 
‘technical’ skills are acquired from following a body of procedurally-designed rules 
imbibed during a period of structured training, often during a time-served apprenticeship. 
The ‘soft’ and ‘tacit’ skills required in service work may entail subjective judgements to 
be made based on practical experience, where the familiarity of these skilful resources 
makes them largely invisible to the job holder (Polanyi, 1967; Lammont and Lucas, 
1999). The small knowledge content and short period of practical experience may not be 
deemed sufficiently complex to justify formal, structured training, and reinforce 
segmentation and adverse selection. 
 
It is clear that the main demand among hospitality employers is for ‘soft’ skills that owe 
more to personal attributes, such as flexibility, reliability, stability, loyalty, and 
punctuality, appearance and displaying the ‘right’ attitude and emotions (for example, 
Lucas and Langlois, 2000; Nickson et al., 2001). This may be little more than an 
employer’s ‘wish-list’, rather than criteria that are firmly grounded in the requirements of 
the workplace (Grugulis and Vincent, 2006). Further it is arguable whether such skills are 
human capital as they appear to be neither a function of training nor job experience. 
Young people may have developed these skills outside the workplace because they are not 
necessarily associated with doing a particular job or may embody desirable attributes to 
do ‘with’ image that happen to be a function of their age. If 16 and 17 year olds are doing 
the similar jobs to their older colleagues or they are specifically recruited to match 
product image there is a moral case for pay equity (LPC, 2001).  
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Desirable personal attributes labelled as skills are difficult to evaluate, so proxies are used 
that tend to stereotype people’s jobs and this may support and legitimise discrimination 
(Grugulis and Vincent, 2006), thus reinforcing segmentation. For example, it is not 
always easy to distinguish the extent to which employment and pay polices are a function 
of a worker’s age alone or personal attributes that are associated with particular age 
groups (Lucas and Langlois, 2000).  It is well known that employers undervalue ‘soft’ 
skills, conversely since these are the skills the ‘demand’, such as communication, 
judgement and initiative that are integral to many customer-service jobs (Sachdev and 
Wilkinson, 1998; Korczynski, 2002) in keeping with segmentation and efficiency models. 
The existence of other more subtle discriminatory forces not only helps institutionalise 
lower pay for young workers but also highlights the perils of signalling the training factor 
as a basis for pay differences. Employers do incorporate an assessment of personal 
attributes but we do not know how far this process is subjective or objective.  
 
We now turn to how the LPC approached the issue of young workers’ pay in the context 
of labour market theory and debates about training and skill. 
 
The minimum wage treatment of 16 and 17 year olds 
 
A problematic group 
The extensive range of literature about young workers and a minimum wages is 
controversial. Although negative employment effects are observed by some (for example 
Brown et al., 1982; Meyer and Wise, 1983; Neumark and Wascher, 1992), commentators 
including Card (1992) and Park and Ratti, (1998) find no evidence to support either 
reductions in teenage employment or school enrolment, while Card and Krueger (1995) 
suggest that a minimum wage could increase youth employment. Similarly reduced 
training opportunities are widely predicted (including Hashimoto, 1982; Leighton and 
Mincer, 1981), but more recent work has observed increased training or indeterminate 
effects (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 2001; Arulampalam et al., 2002). 
 
The lack of clarity about whether younger workers’ low pay reflected lower productivity, 
inexperience, lack of training or simply employer prejudice created a dilemma for the 
LPC in fixing a minimum rate for young workers (Brown, 2002) and informed its 
rationale for initially excluding young workers from the NMW [2]. They were not 
regarded as full participants in the labour market and most were in education and training 
and therefore in need of coaching, experience and training to prepare them for working 
life (LPC, 1998). In short, their human capital was deficient. Extending and enhancing the 
range of government initiatives, including National Traineeships, and Learning Gateway 
(LPC, 2000, pp.175-80), was seen as the best approach to dealing with the ‘vulnerable’ 
10% of young workers not in education, employment or training (NEET).  
 
Making the case for a NMW 
 
Driven by the policy objectives of the Treasury, over the next three years a variety of new 
measures accompanied by financial incentives were rolled out aimed at enhancing young 
workers’ education and training (DTI, 2003), during which time an assessment could be 
made on the NMW’s impact. Three factors prompted the Government to reconsider an 
appropriate minimum wage for this group. Existing rates had not impacted negatively 
upon employment, business costs and inflation, financial support to families and young 
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workers themselves through Education Maintenance Allowances (EMAs) encouraged 
them to stay on at school, while other initiatives, shored up by advice from the 
Connexions Service, facilitated training, with the Entry 2 Employment Programme acting 
as a gateway to more advanced training on MAs and further education (DTI, 2003). The 
LPC duly responded to the request to consider a detailed case for a NMW (LPC, 2003) in 
the context of these policies (DTI, 2003).  
 
Assessing young workers’ pay was hampered by limitations of Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data and posed problems of reliability (small sample size and low coverage of those 
paid below the income tax threshold) and validity (high degree of proxy responses). 
Although the LPC found evidence that some full-time jobs with no training were paying 
only £2 an hour (LPC, 2001), market forces appeared to be working to most young 
workers’ advantage, with only 25% earning less than the youth development rate (YDR) 
of £3.60. Age-related pay was not widespread and where found, was usually restricted to 
a few positions or to new recruits in the first few months (LPC, 2005). 
 
A key influence on the LPC’s scope to act was general stakeholder agreement, with some 
key retail and hospitality employer bodies now articulating explicit, if conditional, support 
for a NMW (LPC, 2004).  The British Hospitality Association (BHA) conceded that 
young workers may undertake the same tasks as older workers but are simply less skilled 
or experienced (i.e. more limited human capital) and, in keeping with the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI) and British Retail Consortium (BRC), argued that a NMW set at 
a cautious level, but not automatically uprated with other rates, would prevent exploitation 
by disreputable traders and remove the negative image of these sectors (LPC, 2004).  
  
Diminishing reliance on the human capital argument is also evident. Employers also 
valued young workers’ flexibility and only those in trainee positions were seen as 
generally less productive. Hence the continued exemption of trainees (apprentices and 
those on pre-apprenticeship programmes), even though there was acknowledgement that 
workplace learning takes place in diverse ways that do not necessarily depend upon 
participation in government initiatives or the acquisition of formal qualifications 
(Kitching and Blackburn, 2003). Some young workers needed more direct management 
and supervision, whereas others demonstrated flexibility and quickness to learn (Neathey 
et al., 2004).  Concurring that young workers rarely held supervisory positions, Heyes 
(2004) also found that some employers were cautious to expose young workers to 
customers, whereas others deliberately sought young people who are compatible with 
their brand or image. 
 
Trade unions and youth organisations had long supported a youth NMW (LPC, 1998, 
2001) relying on arguments that moved beyond human capital theory, particularly the 
need to prevent exploitation. Additionally, a higher level of pay would mean that students 
could reduce their working hours and spend more time studying. Furthermore, 16 and 17 
year olds were generally ineligible for means tested benefits, yet needed basic necessities 
and might be contributing to family income, and extending the scope of the NMW would 
help increase employment rights’ awareness among young people (LPC, 2004). 
 
The main employer arguments against a NMW were grounded in human capital theory. 
But concerns about legal restrictions on employment, the need for greater supervision and 
inability to perform the full range of tasks restricting the value young workers could 
create (LPC, 2001) appear to have largely abated (Neathey et al., 2004; Heyes, 2004). 
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Only a trenchant group still maintained that young workers’ pay should be left to market 
forces (British Chambers of Commerce, Associations of Multiple Retailers, Small 
Business Council, Unquoted Companies Group) (LPC, 2004). The price sensitivity of 
young workers is illustrated by the fact that employers would only switch to substituting 
young workers with older workers if their price differential ceased to be significantly 
different. 
 
Noting that the UK remained the only major country with no minimum wage coverage for 
16 and 17 year old workers (LPC, 2004, pp.83-92), the experience of other countries 
yielded little evidence of adverse effects on employment or participation in education 
where a modest rate was set significantly below the adult rate (LPC, 2004). The LPC, 
sharing others’ fear of undue exploitation, also considered that a NMW would encourage 
young people to see themselves as valued. Wages appeared to have little influence on the 
allocation of 16 and 17 year olds to work and education, while the introduction of means 
tested EMAs in September 2004 was expected to encourage young people to stay in 
education. A NMW of £3 an hour would have minimal impact because it was well below 
the vast majority of young workers’ current pay levels and also complied with employers’ 
wish for a cautious rate. There would be a maximum of 40,000 potential gainers - 6.5% of 
all 16 and 17 year olds, although more time would be needed for the effects to be 
measured [3]. The need to promote wider awareness was also noted. 
 
Recent developments 
 
We have seen a further refinement of the rationale for a youth NMW, with the LPC 
(2006) arguing that it should serve as a wage floor to prevent very low wages, as had been 
the case when the other NMW rates were introduced in 1999. Most stakeholders have 
reported little or no negative impact. Although rising numbers of NEETs is part of a trend 
that predated the new rate and not because of it, the proportion of NEETs has been 
smaller where EMAs are available (Maguire et al., 2006). The young workers’ rate 
increased by 10% to £3.30 in October 2006 and will be subject to biennial review at the 
same time as other NMW rates, currently £5.35 (22+) and £4.40 (18-21) The exemption 
of MAs remains under review, although they now receive £80 a week (UNISON, 2005; 
DTI, 2006). Recognition that there should be no correlation between the 16 and 17 year 
old rate and the YDR will need to be reflected by maintaining a substantial difference 
between the young workers’ rate and the rates applicable at 18 years and above.  
 
The literature points to two broad research questions that underpin the remainder of the 
paper. In the context of theory and debates about training and skills, is the LPC’s 
presumption that young workers are distinct justified? Is this presumption reflected in 
employers’ pay and employment policies and do their practices perpetuate and reinforce 
inequality and discrimination towards young workers? 
 
Data and methods                                      
 
This paper presents selected findings from a study about impact of the NMW on young 
workers in hospitality firms in North Wales. Having used a postal survey [4] to gain 
access to companies, 15 (of 40) managers [5] who consented to a semi-structured 
interview agreed to participate. Details of each establishment are shown in Table I. The 
names of the respondents have been changed to give anonymity. 
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Two distinct approaches were deployed to probe the processes underlying employers’ pay 
practices and the basis for their pay differentials between the three groups of workers 
marked out by the NMW by age (16-17, 18-21, 22+). Firstly, general questions about job 
tasks, responsibilities, skills and knowledge; the process of wage determination; use of the 
YDR and training. Secondly, two schedules tailored to the types of job undertaken in such 
hospitality establishments to enable managers to provide measures of differences in job 
content (tasks, responsibilities and the working conditions) and their perceptions of 
employees’ personal qualities (abilities, skills, knowledge and effort). Although we did 
not seek to examine jobs in accordance with any formal method of job evaluation, given 
the absence of suitable written documentation, our exploratory method was informed by 
the principles of job evaluation (ACAS, 2006), human capital theory and the concomitant 
problematic of measuring soft skills based on attributes that are personal in service jobs 
that is acknowledged in segmentation and efficiency wage theories.  
 
Measures of job content were based on 17 job attributes. Employers were asked to give a 
specific score to indicate the number of times each job attribute was undertaken (1 = 
never, 2 = rarely (once every 10 or more shifts), 3 = occasionally (once every 3-9 shifts) 
and 4 = frequently (every shift or every other shift). Higher scores indicate more tasks, 
responsibility and unpleasant working conditions. The highest achievable score was 56. 
Perceptions of employees’ personal attributes were based on assessments of differences in 
workers’ abilities, skills, knowledge and effort. Employers scored these attributes as 
‘quality standards’ (1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = average, 4 = satisfactory and 5 = 
excellent). The highest attainable score was 65. More details of both approaches are given 
in Tables II and III below. As noted above, this is neither conventional job evaluation nor 
is it an ‘evaluation’ exercise that sought to incorporate the results of both approaches in 
relation to pay. Rather, we are analysing the job and attributes scores independently to 
provide clearer explanation for the pay differences between young and older workers. 
Combining the two scores in relation to pay would not be a valid measure. 
 
The interviews also enabled managers to provide further explanation and justification for 
the scores given in the job content and employees’ personal attributes analysis.  Template 
analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was used to analyse the rest of the interview content 
by common themes, patterns and sub-topics and we use examples of firms’ responses to 
amplify upon their employment practices and qualify the findings of their evaluations and 
perceptions. 
 
The reluctance of managers to consent to an interview and the fact that only 38% of them 
subsequently confirmed their intentions means that number of cases is small. Hence we 
can only claim to provide indicative results from a detailed insight into the factors that 
underlie the process of wage setting in these firms. These indications contribute to an 
understanding of how far variations in pay for these different age groups can be 
objectively justified. In this sense, we raise some important questions to guide more 
robust future research enquiries.  
 
“Take in Table I” 
 
Findings 
 
Hiring, training and wage setting 
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Employment practices were rather informal and pragmatic and largely driven by the local 
labour market within the particular coastal area or town. Although there were shortages of 
highly skilled workers, such as chefs and cooks, most localities had a good supply of 
young workers at a local school or college. Virtually all young workers are students, 
although we cannot identify exact numbers in two firms (Table I). They were usually 
known to the respondents through other family members and friends. Exceptionally, 
Crispy Fast Food paid £25 for personal recommendation and a further £25 if the new 
recruit stayed for six months.  
 
We did have a problem until Christmas and then we increased the wages of the 
under 18s to the same level as the rest, we did have more people applying and we 
had a better pick. (Crispy Fast Food) 
 
Hiring through personal recommendation was deemed to produce better calibre workers 
and there was a notable absence of a formal interview systematically based on either job 
description or personal specification. Many respondents were reluctant to use more formal 
methods, such as Job Centres, because of low quality applicants. Managers provided 
highly mixed reports and views of young workers on government training schemes that 
included the phrases ‘never again’, ‘not occurred to me’ and ‘took the youth trainee from 
my last pub with me’. A number expressed a preference for student workers over 16 year 
old school leavers because they ‘are more intelligent’, ‘more assertive and confident’, 
‘can ask a friend to cover, and s/he might take over if X quits’ and ‘more willing to learn’. 
The ‘right personality’ also counted a good deal for many managers and these qualities 
were more likely to be found in students. Terms mentioned included ‘outgoing’, ‘friendly, 
chatty and smart’ , ‘lively’, ‘jolly’ ‘bubbly’, ‘happy’, ‘able to mingle with customers and 
have a laugh’, ‘have something about them’, ‘clean’ and ‘smart’.  
 
Many respondents stated that applicants did not require any formal minimum education or 
formal qualifications, and often preferred to ‘train from scratch’ and ‘to our ways’. Young 
workers willingness to learn and work unsocial hours gave them some advantages over 
older, more experienced workers. Such young workers were often ‘encouraged’ to return 
until they finished university.  
 
We always have a problem getting good staff and have to rely heavily on kids. 
That is why we try to pay more to good workers, who we want to return to us every 
summer. (Sunshine Café) 
 
Training was mainly learning as they work ‘on the job’, often with the guidance and 
support of an older colleague. Reaching EWS depended on the person and could be 
anything from a week to a few months. As ‘school kids were not expected to go on 
courses’, young, part-time workers were deemed neither to be in need formal training nor 
to be interested, unless they were planning to be chefs. Eight establishments appeared to 
offer lower level NVQs, of which only customer care and food preparation and hygiene 
would be relevant to workers under 18 years. Even though Crispy Fast Food offered 
NVQs to all its workers, the manager lamented that most did not stay long enough to 
complete them. Only Scampi’s Burger Bar provided comprehensive formal and inclusive 
training for all workers through its own training centre.  
 
Apart from reference to the local labour market, there was limited evidence of systematic 
pay setting methods, although two cafes designed lower weekly pay for cost-based 
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administrative reasons to avoid the cost and paperwork associated with paying income tax 
and national insurance. Consequently, young workers could only work a maximum of 
four shifts per week in Sunshine Café. Pay progression was usually based on individual 
job performance but this was rather loosely defined.  
 
Rather informally actually, my wife and I increase their wages if we think that they 
are doing satisfactory work. This is only a small business so there is no formal 
way of assessing….It has nothing to do with the NMW actually. I am aware that 
some places pay as low as £2.50 an hour. I also ask my students in school to find 
out what they are being paid. So in a way it is the market rate in this area. 
(Murphy’s Pub) 
 
Most respondents opposed the exclusion of young workers from the NMW on the grounds 
that age was not a valid criterion. Others thought exclusion was justified by the limited 
nature of the jobs undertaken and young workers’ inexperience. As the general interview 
questions yielded relatively few insights into the main factors differentiating young and 
older workers’ pay, further evidence from the ‘evaluation’ exercise follows.   
 
Job content by age group 
 
Table II indicates the scores based on managers’ measures of tasks, responsibilities and 
working conditions and the mean minimum rate by age group for all establishments. 
There are some common features about all these low paid jobs – the work is routine and 
not mentally demanding and involves frequent cleaning. Nevertheless, the overall job 
content of young workers is markedly different from the rest of their colleagues.  
 
“Take in Table II”  
 
This difference reflects the fact that young workers generally undertake lower level tasks, 
have lesser responsibilities and are subject to less onerous working conditions than both 
other groups of workers (Table II), which is consistent with lower pay rates. The main 
areas of difference are in relation to the preparation of food and beverage, serving 
customers, having responsibility for money and working after 10pm, most of which 
cannot be undertaken until age 18 in licensed premises.  
 
The lowest hourly paid workers are usually at school or college, typically aged 16 and 17 
but as young as 13, who work at weekends or in the holidays serving food from the 
kitchen, collecting glasses and dishes and washing them and clearing up and cleaning. 
Some may engage in simple food preparation. These workers have no direct responsibility 
and managers regard them as ‘assisting and ‘looking for guidance’. Hence lower pay is a 
function of more limited tasks and very limited responsibility, and further pay progression 
is dependant upon undertaking more tasks.  
 
They are mainly school students and their tasks mainly involve dish washing and 
some of the waitressing. They are mainly assisting us, so they don’t have any 
direct responsibility, apart from taking food from the kitchen or making sure that 
the dishes are washed. (Happy Days Restaurant) 
  
There were some cases where young workers do similar jobs to older colleagues, but are 
paid lower rates, suggesting tasks and responsibility are not the primary determinants of 
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pay. Hence we might expect the difference in pay to be a reflection of young workers’ 
personal attributes because employers perceive them not as important and valuable as 
those of older workers.  
 
Basically I have one girl who is 16 and she comes in on Saturdays is on £2.75 and 
the rest are on the minimum wages. All the workers do the same tasks, involving 
cleaning, and waitressing apart from the chef who is on a higher wage. (Hafod 
Café) 
 
Job content was identical for workers of all ages in the three establishments that did not 
differentiate 16 and 17 year olds’ pay. Paradise Hotel provided a wider range of jobs that 
these young workers could undertake, including housekeeping, while Scampi’s Burger 
House had the same starter rate for all ages, with pay progression at four and six months. 
The owner of a third establishment noted the following: 
 
... I don’t discriminate against people in regards to their age. ..As I used to be a 
catering worker myself I appreciate my workers. (Little Dragon Restaurant)  
 
Employees’ personal attributes by age group 
 
Table III shows the scores based on employers’ perceptions of ability, skills, knowledge 
and effort and the mean minimum rate by age group for all establishments. There are few 
common features across age groups, other than the ability to work in teams and poor work 
related qualifications, so that young workers’ personal attribute scores are consistently 
lower than both other age groups’. The greater difference in each age group’s personal 
attributes compared to their job content may be a more relevant indicator of pay 
differentials, because it relates to human capital. A small number of respondents found 
this aspect difficult to undertake because personal attributes were related to individuals 
rather than to their age.  
 
“Take in Table III” 
 
We have already noted that managers’ recruitment preferences are driven by a perception 
that students have desirable non-work related personal attributes compared to other young 
people aged 16-17. They also perceive that young workers have the fewest work-related 
qualifications, more limited work experience and, consequently, have not developed a 
portfolio of work-related skills and abilities, apart from the ability to work in a team. 
Young workers’ lower level of interpersonal skills is linked to their work and life 
experiences. Young workers are not always lacking initiative and unwilling to solve 
problems or make decisions, as several managers mentioned they are often ‘keen’ and 
‘eager to do so’. However, lacking ‘common sense’, they do not necessarily come up with 
the right answer or do not think of the consequences. Hence experience is perceived as a 
function of age.   
 
Most of the older workers have a family, have reared families and cooked for 
families. And so they draw their own expertise to the kitchen…Younger ones are 
able to make basic decision and we expect them to use their own initiative to work. 
For example if there isn’t any customers, they should clean the counter or the 
pots, there is always something that needs doing without being told. (Blue Water 
Café) 
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Enthusiasm and enjoyment of work were seen to be advantageous attributes that 
compensated for the lack of some skills, although some young workers did not take their 
work seriously. Flexibility cuts both ways. Some young workers are less dedicated but 
others can be called in at short notice or will ask a friend to cover if they are unwilling or 
unavailable for work.   
 
Discussion 
 
How far can the LPC’s presumption of distinctiveness be objectively justified? 
 
16 and 17 year olds are not distinct as a homogeneous group but because of their diverse 
labour market circumstances. One can understand why the LPC waited to see the results 
of the range of Government measures designed to facilitate increased participation in 
education and training and to target the most problematic segments of NEETs. However, 
this did not necessarily justify reliance largely on human capital arguments (Becker, 1964; 
Mincer, 1974) to postpone the fixing of a young workers’ NMW for so long. Particularly 
when considering that the concentration of employment for young people is in sectors 
making little investment in training (Grossberg and Sicilian, 1999), where EWS and the 
acquisition of soft skills can be achieved relatively quickly (Lucas and Langlois, 2000) or 
where managers seek personal attributes unrelated to training (Nickson et al., 2001) that 
are often undervalued (Korczynski, 2002). This suggests that the arguments advanced in 
segmentation (Rubery, 1992; Sachdev and Wilkinson, 1998) and efficiency wage theories 
(Weiss, 1986) are more relevant, and that employers’ failure to recognise the skills that 
are associated with these jobs may reinforce inequality and discrimination. If, as it now 
seems, that young workers whose employers do not base their pay structure on the NMW 
can claim pay discrimination under the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (2006), 
then questions about unfairness are raised about other young workers in identical 
situations that are paid a NMW.  
 
Lower pay for young workers may be justified where there are clear differences in the 
jobs they do and in their accumulation of human capital but not necessarily in 
contemporary jobs that require little or no training for a person of any age. If we can infer 
potential discrimination on the basis of false assumptions related to stereotyping, what 
training can deliver and the very nature of skill (Grugulis and Vincent, 2006) we cannot 
establish a clear basis that is tantamount to objective justification. One might also 
question the substantial difference in their NMW, which although in keeping with past 
practice that reflected very different labour market conditions, may not be sustainable in 
contemporary jobs. The predominance of the retail and hospitality sectors suggests that 
some benchmarking might be possible to fix a fairer rate.  
 
Is this (pragmatic) presumption reflected in employers’ pay and employment policies and 
do their practices perpetuate and reinforce inequality and discrimination towards young 
workers? 
 
This study has confirmed firms’ employment practices of hiring, training and wage setting 
as informal and pragmatic, which could increase the likelihood of inequitable and 
discriminatory treatment (Grugulis and Vincent, 2006).  Employers actively seek and 
employ young, student workers because they embody desirable attributes and the ‘right 
personality’ (Nickson et al., 2001) and are keen to retain them in the absence of good non-
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student workers being available. Young workers may or may not share the pay 
progression opportunities of their older work colleagues, which appears to be largely a 
function of the technical constraints of the workplace.  
 
Most managers in our study opposed young workers’ exclusion on grounds of potential 
exploitation and paid a rate that on average (£3.44) was close to the extant rate for 
workers aged 18-21 (£3.50), and still exceeds the current young workers’ NMW rate 
(£3.30). Nevertheless, this reflected their perceptions that young workers had more 
limited skills and attributes and were doing smaller jobs. These perceptions have some 
validity in terms of the measures that we gave them to quantify these differences and are 
based, in most cases, on lower human capital and more limited job content.  Although our 
data provide some evidence that pay may be linked with tangible and observable job 
features, such as simpler tasks, and personal attributes and limited qualifications, we are 
not able to say what wage value, if any, employers attach to less tangible, non-observable 
and unknown skills and attributes. By paying an average rate that still exceeds the current 
NMW, it is conceivable that these employers already applied a wage premium that valued 
the desirable attributes of students. If so, it is possible that non-student young workers are 
being segmented or subjected to adverse selection.  
 
By using methods that are exploratory and tentative, we have started to develop a more 
formal basis and rationale for identifying how employers differentiate young workers 
from other workers in terms of the jobs they do, their personal attributes and how this 
compares to appropriate rates of pay. Lower pay is consistent with more limited job 
content and personal attributes, in keeping with the principles of job evaluation and 
human capital theory. We were unable to examine job descriptions and did not seek to 
combine measures of job content and perceptions of personal attributes in assessing ‘fair’ 
pay, using each independently in relation to young workers and older workers to provide a 
clearer explanation for the differences in pay between them. The next step would be to 
develop a more inclusive method that also captures some of the intangibles about jobs and 
workers to understand how far all of these factors inform pay differentials. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this exploratory study we have reviewed the LPC’s treatment of young workers over an 
eight year period, with reference to labour market theories and the issues they raise in 
relation to skill, training and pay. We have noted a shift in the arguments used to justify a 
NMW and how consensus among the stakeholders, arising from growing employer 
support, enabled the LPC to propose a third NMW that was implemented in 2004. 
Although we recognise that young people aged 16-17 have diverse labour market 
circumstances, we have questioned the presumption that young workers are a distinctive 
group with reference to contemporary notions of skill and concomitant training 
requirements and can infer some tenuous assumptions that appear to underlie the basis for 
their differential treatment. Young workers are a diverse group and we need to be sure 
that those in work are not being penalised because of undue sensitivities about some 
vulnerable 16 and 17 year olds and that different policy prescriptions do not conflict. 
  
Employers’ employment and pay practices both reflect and reinforce the presumption of 
distinctiveness in the workplace for 16 and 17 year old labour that is almost wholly 
student-based. Although some of these practices appear to be formulated informally and 
implemented pragmatically, our attempt to provide managers with some objectively 
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justifiable means to measure jobs and perceptions of personal attributes in relation to pay 
appears to have some validity, even though it is exploratory and indicative. But we are 
still left with the possibility that the sorts of skills that are associated with the jobs these 
young workers do are not being fully recognised or valued, which may reinforce 
inequality and discrimination in some cases. The challenge is to unlock these doors of 
perception through more comprehensive and wide ranging research. Perhaps clarity will 
begin to emerge if sufficient numbers of young workers claim and succeed in establishing 
pay discrimination under the forthcoming Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, 
but this may a long way into the future.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Age discrimination has prompted other countries, such as Canada and Australia, to re-
examine their approach to young workers. While Canada had been phasing out its junior 
rates, Australia was unable to come up with any feasible non-discriminatory alternatives, 
and has retained their junior rates (LPC, 2004). 
2. Youth pay rates were regulated by wages councils for a considerable part of the 
twentieth century until young workers were removed from scope in 1986 in the interests 
of labour market deregulation and in the context of government employment and training 
initiatives, such as Youth Training Scheme (YTS). An estimated 500,000 workers under 
21 years of age were removed from the scope of wages councils system, which was 
thought to cover some 2.7 million workers (Lucas, 1990, p.325). 
3. Later estimates put the figure at 32,000 (LPC, 2006). 
4. A sample of 660 firms yielded 125 responses (19%). For details see Keegan, (2004)  
5. Includes owner-managers. 
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Table I:  Establishment characteristics 
 
Establishment 
 
   Minimum rates 
Location Total 
workers  
Total 
student
workers 
(16-17) 
Total 
non-
student
workers  
(16-17) 
Minimum
rate  
(16-17) 
 
Minimum 
rate 
(18-21) 
 
Minimum 
rate 
(22 and  
above) 
Queen Vic Pub Coastal 6 2 0 £3.70 £3.70 £4.10 
Rover’s Return Pub Town 15 X 0 £3.50 £4.10 £4.10 
Murphy’s Pub Town 5 X 0 £3.50 £4.10 £4.10 
Dove Hotel Coastal 9 2 0 £3.75 £4.30 £4.30 
Paradise Hotel Coastal 30 16 0 £3.30 £3.30* £4.10** 
Lagoon Hotel 
 
Coastal 
 
12 
 
5 
 
0 
 
£3.00 
 
£4.10 
 
£4.10 
Crispy Fast Food+ 
 
Town 
 
22 
 
7 
 
0 
 
£4.20 
 
£4.20 
 
£4.20 
Mama’s Restaurant 
 
Coastal 
 
21 
 
6 
 
0 
 
£3.50 
 
£4.10 
 
£4.10 
Scampi’s Burger 
House+ 
 
Town 
 
85 
 
26 
 
0 
 
£3.90 
 
£4.10 
 
£4.10 
Little Dragon 
Restaurant 
 
Town 
 
10 
 
2 
 
0 
 
£4.50 
 
No 
workers 
 
£4.50 
Happy Days 
Restaurant 
Town 7 3 2 £2.50 No 
workers 
£4.20 
Sunshine Café 
 
Coastal 
 
29 
 
23 
 
0 
 
£2.50 
 
£3.50 
 
£4.50 
Blue Water Café 
 
Town 
 
16 
 
12 
 
0 
 
£3.50 
No 
workers 
 
£4.50 
Hafod Café 
 
Coastal 
 
10 
 
4 
 
0 
 
£2.75 
 
£3.50 
 
£4.10 
Phoenix Club 
 
Coastal 
 
35 
 
0 
 
0 
No 
workers 
 
£4.25 
 
£4.25 
All establishments 
(mean hourly rate) 
     
£3.44 
 
£3.94 
 
£4.22 
Range     £2.50-
£4.50 
£3.30-
£4.30 
£4.10- 
£4.50 
Std deviation      = 0.59  = 0.34  = 0.16 
Note: * Hourly pay rate for 18-20 ** hourly pay rate for 21 and above. The NMW rates in 
force were £3.50 for young adults and £4.10 for older workers +Franchise. X Employs 
students but number unspecified. 
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 Table II:  Job content and minimum pay (all establishments ) 
 
 Young workers 
(16-17 ) 
(N=14) 
 
Young adult 
workers (18-21) 
(N=12) 
Older workers 
(22 and above) 
(N=15) 
Tasks    
Preparation of drinks  2.6 3.8 3.9 
Preparation of food 2.2 3.4 3.6 
Cooking 1.4 1.8 1.6 
Cleaning 4.0 4.0 3.9 
Serving customers 2.7 3.9 4.0 
Mean (all tasks) 2.6 3.4 3.4 
Responsibility    
Responsibility for money 2.4 3.7 3.8 
Responsibility for training new workers 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Responsibility for supervision of 
workers 
1.1 1.3 2.4 
Mean (all responsibilities) 1.5 2.1 2.6 
Working conditions    
Routine work 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Physically strenuous work 1.5 4.0 2.4 
Mentally demanding work 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Regular variation in working hours 2.3 2.8 2.7 
Work before 9am 2.0 2.0 2.3 
Work after 10pm 2.7 3.5 3.5 
Mean (all working conditions) 2.3 2.9 2.7 
    
Mean score (all job attributes) 2.1 2.8 2.9 
Mean lowest hourly rate  £3.44 £3.94 £4.22 
Range £2.50-£4.50 £3.30-£4.30 £4.10-£4.50 
Std deviation  = 0.59  = 0.34  = 0.16 
 
Note: Mean scores based on 1=never, 2=rarely, 3=occasionally and 4=frequently 
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Table III:  Employees’ personal attributes (all establishments) 
 
 Young workers 
(16-17) 
(N=14) 
Young adult 
workers 
(18-21) 
(N=12) 
Older workers 
(22 and above) 
(N=15) 
Ability/skills/knowledge    
Professional work related qualifications 1.0 1.3 2.1 
Prior work experience in the industry 1.2 2.3 3.7 
Prior work experience in general 1.2 2.6 4.3 
Interpersonal skills 2.5 3.6 4.7 
Ability to solve problems 1.9 2.8 4.5 
Ability to make decisions 2.0 3.0 4.5 
Ability to work in a team 4.4 4.3 4.7 
Ability to handle responsibility 2.2 3.4 4.8 
Mean  (all abilities, skills and 
knowledge) 
2.1 2.9 4.2 
Effort    
Enthusiasm 2.4 3.3 4.5 
Flexible in hours worked 2.2 3.2 4.5 
Flexible in carrying out tasks 3.4 4.1 4.7 
Initiative  2.2 3.3 4.5 
Mean (all effort) 2.6 3.5 4.6 
    
Mean score (all employees’ personal 
job attributes) 
2.4 3.2 4.4 
Mean lowest hourly rate  £3.44 £3.94 £4.22 
Range £2.50-£4.50 £3.30-£4.30 £4.10-£4.50 
Std deviation  = 0.59  = 0.34  = 0.16 
 
Note: Mean scores based on 1=very poor, 2=poor, 3=average, 4=satisfactory and 
5=excellent. 
 
